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Institutional brokerage rates have been in decline. We investigate whether this reduction has 
coincided with a fall in benefits provided by brokers to institutional asset managers. We use 
trade packages from both active and passive equity funds from 1995 to 2001, and active equity 
funds from 2002 to 2010. We find that later period active funds recoup a combined 1.75 basis 
point benefit (from price impact cost recovery and short-term alpha) per basis point of brokerage 
cost. Later period active investors saw improved trade price impact and shorter-term alpha net 
benefits, relative to earlier period active investors. These results are robust after controlling for 
trade characteristics and cross-sectional variation over time. Our findings suggest brokers 
innovate to provide valuable services in the subsequent, lower brokerage environment. 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G23 








We find that brokers enable active equity managers to trade at favorable prices. We 
measure this advantage in two ways. First, higher brokerage payments are associated with lower 
price impact from trading. Second, higher brokerage is associated with better post-trade market-
adjusted returns. Our evidence suggests that brokers create value both through improving trade 
execution, as well as through a range of services that enhance investment choice. This effect has 
become more pronounced recently, as brokerage rates (as a percent of trade value) have fallen.  
The assessment of brokerage costs and benefits is challenging. Payments to brokers are 
relatively clear; they are explicit and made when trades occur. However, benefits received from 
brokers are varied, difficult to quantify, and dispersed through time (e.g. transaction services, 
access to research reports, access to analysts, security allocations in primary market transactions, 
etc.). Past research comparing brokerage benefits to costs has typically focused on comparing 
brokerage payments to trade price impact. These studies suggest that brokerage costs exceed 
trade price impact benefits. Hence these authors conclude that there may be other benefits 
provided by brokers, but do not attempt to catalog or measure these contributions.1 
We investigate the relation between brokerage costs, implicit trading costs and market-
adjusted returns (alpha) using two sample periods of fund manager trades: active and passive 
fund trades from 1995 to 2001 (period 1 or 'P1'); and active fund trades from 2002 to 2010 
(period 2 or 'P2') on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). These two samples cover a 
period of time that saw significant technological change in the trading environment, as well as 
marked reductions in percentage brokerage costs.  
We have detailed information for brokerage costs. Calculating benefits from employing 
brokers is more complex. One key possible benefit to fund managers from brokers would be 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988), Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). 
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lower price impact of trades. Hence we use price impact measures to assess non-brokerage 
(implicit) trading costs incurred by our sample funds. Of course, brokers provide their clients 
services other than transaction assistance. Rather than attempt to list other possible broker 
services, and measure their associated benefits, we focus on the post-trade investment 
performance of each trade package and investigate its relation to the brokerage that was paid. 
Specifically, we compute 20-day (short-run) and 20-day to 1-year (long-run) market-adjusted 
returns subsequent to each trade package and estimate the relation between brokerage costs and 
post-trade alphas. Associating broker benefits with particular trades is difficult – the broker who 
processes the trade may not have provided the relevant non-trade services supporting this 
transaction. Hence, we assume that higher brokerage payments are associated with transactions 
that generate higher alpha.  
Consistent with other studies, we find that estimated price impact improvement cannot, 
by itself, justify paying higher brokerage rates. However, when we include estimated post-trade 
investment performance, then higher brokerage payments appear to provide benefits that exceed 
brokerage costs. The net gain to brokerage has become more apparent recently, as brokerage 
costs (relative to trade value) have fallen.  
We find that brokerage costs have halved and turnover increased tenfold during our 
entire sample period (including both P1 and P2). Over this time there has been little change in 
the market shares of brokers – consistent with these changes to costs and turnover being 
technologically driven, rather than a consequence of a major change in the competitive 
environment of the brokerage industry.  
Our regression analysis shows that passive (defined to be index and enhanced index 
funds) funds experience lower implicit (non-brokerage) transaction costs when greater 
percentage brokerage is paid during P1. Active funds earn higher long-term alpha, but have 
statistically insignificant differences in implicit transaction costs when higher brokerage is paid 
during P1. With falling brokerage rates in the second (P2) sample, we find that active funds 
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have reduced implicit transaction costs and increased short-term alpha for higher brokerage 
paid. These results are robust using Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional analysis and an analysis of 
the residuals from the baseline regression. During the recent decline in brokerage rates benefits 
from brokerage services are more than commensurate with brokerage paid.    
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background and hypotheses 
development. Section 3 describes the data used and develops our empirical method. Section 4 
reports our results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
Several papers demonstrate that paying higher brokerage costs does not necessarily 
result in commensurately lower implicit transaction costs. For example,  Berkowitz, Logue and 
Noser (1988) find a one basis point increase in brokerage paid is associated with only a 0.23 
basis point decrease in price impact (measured as the difference in the traded price relative to 
Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) that day). This suggests an uneconomic net 
incremental benefit to paying higher brokerage. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Comerton-
Forde et al. (2005) find little association between trade price impact and brokerage paid.  
A possible explanation for these results is that brokers provide benefits other than 
execution services. That is, an incomplete account of benefits provided by brokers may obscure 
the relation between brokerage paid and benefits received. Examples of additional benefits 
include analytic services, broker research, IPO allocations (e.g. Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang 
(2007); Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2011))  and soft dollar benefits (e.g. Blume (1993) and 
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001)).  
Rather than listing and valuing possible ancillary benefits, we focus on the consequences 
of employing additional services. That is, if these bundled brokerage services are associated 
with improved stock selection or portfolio construction (e.g. Womack (1996), Barber et al. 
(2001), Aitken, Muthuswamy and Wong (2001) and Kadan et al. (2009)), we expect a positive 
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relation between brokerage paid and abnormal returns for each transaction for active funds. 
Further, we expect different types of funds to have varying need for ancillary services. For 
example, we expect no relation between brokerage paid per trade and the market-adjusted 
excess returns for index funds and a weaker (relative to active funds) relation between trade 
brokerage and alpha for enhanced index funds.  In addition, passive (i.e. index and enhanced 
index) funds may face lower adverse selection costs, thereby resulting in simpler trade 
construction with lower price impact. This leads to our first two hypotheses: 
H1:  Brokerage costs are positively related to transaction market-adjusted excess 
returns and negatively related to implicit transaction costs, controlling for trade 
characteristics and fund characteristics.  
H2:  The estimated relation between brokerage costs and implicit transaction costs is 
more negative for passive funds than for active funds. Also, for passive (index and 
enhanced index) funds there is a weaker relation between transaction brokerage costs 
and market-adjusted excess returns. 
In assessing the value brokers create for active investors we need to recognize that our 
sample periods contain events related to the 2003 Global Settlement.2 Broker firm actions noted 
in the Global Settlement may not have been consistent with providing long-term benefits to 
investors from some bundled services (e.g. stock research). Almost all penalized firms are major 
brokers in Australia (see Jackson (2005)) and have changed their practices since the Global 
Settlement. Hence, in the period subsequent to the announcement of the Global Settlement there 
may have been a shift from bundling to pure execution services for active funds. This could be 
due a reduction in the demand or supply of broker research (partly as a result of Global 
Settlement (e.g. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007)) and/or improved trading technologies, which 
                                                 
2
 On 28 April 2003 a legally enforceable agreement was reached by the SEC, NYSE, NASDAQ and the largest 10 
investment banking firms to address conflict of interest issues arising from the activities of investment banks in 
providing diverse securities market services to clients. 
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bring a focus to transactions services. Whether a lower brokerage environment results in a 
stronger relation between brokerage and implicit transaction costs is unclear. Even with lower 
overall brokerage rates, there may be a stronger link between these payments and the quality of 
transaction services. This motivates our final hypothesis: 
H3:  The brokerage and implicit transaction cost relation for active funds is stronger 
in P2 than in P1.  
3. Data and Approach 
3.1.  Data  
Our two samples use daily institutional trades recorded in the Portfolio Analytics 
Database (PAD). PAD is a privately constructed database for academic research that was 
compiled using an 'invitation' approach to the largest Australian equity managers in Australia, 
based on their funds under management (FUM). The data were collected with the support of 
investment consulting firms who have close connections to these fund management firms. Two 
data requests were made to each fund manager. The first request was for data from the period 
January 1995 to December 2001; 18 active and 8 passive equity funds (3 index and 5 enhanced 
index) provided both monthly holdings data as well as daily trades. The second request provided 
similar data for the period January 2002 through December 2010, with 33 active funds 
participating. The two samples do not necessarily share common funds and so cannot be linked 
explicitly. Both datasets contain the date (without timestamp), ticker, quantity traded, value-
weighted average price traded, brokerage costs, and broker identity for every trade for each 
fund. Month-end portfolio holdings (ticker and number of shares held) of each fund were also 
provided by each fund.  
Market capitalization, capitalization adjustment and dividend information for the stocks 
in every portfolio are taken from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
(SIRCA) Share Price and Price Relative Database (SPPR). Daily opening, high, low, closing 
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prices, VWAP, and trading volume for stocks listed on the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) are also provided by SIRCA.  
3.2. Trade Packages and Broker Trade Packages 
Institutions may spread their transactions (from a single trade decision) across time to 
reduce price impact; i.e. they may package a trade decision into a series of transactions. Hence, 
we follow the approach of Chan and Lakonishok (1995) to identify and consolidate these trade 
packages. A buy (sell) transaction is considered part of a trade package if there is less than a 
five-day gap from the previous purchase (sale) of the stock. Further, each trade package is 
decomposed into trade packages handled by a specific broker to form broker trade packages. 
Hence, a broker trade package consolidates purchases (sales) by the same broker occurring 
within five days.  
3.3. Implicit Transaction Costs and Alpha 
We use two measures of implicit transaction costs: Price Impact and Trade to VWAP. 
We follow Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and calculate Price Impact as the traded price relative 
to the opening price on the first day of a trade package. Price Impact measures upward price 
pressure for buy trades (or downward pressure for sells) relative to the price just prior to the 
transaction. Trade to VWAP measures the traded price on a day relative to the value-weighted 
average traded price that day (the VWAP price). By buying below or selling above the VWAP 
price the fund manager acquires or disposes of stock on better terms than the average investor 
that day. Trade to VWAP is used in Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) and is a commonly 
used benchmark for assessing execution costs.3 These measures are given by: 
PriceImpact = (Pricet/OpeningPricet - 1) * Buy            (1) 
                                                 
3
 For example, it is used in the Institutional Investor's Annual Transaction Cost Analysis Survey to rank fund 
managers based on their trading costs (see Sweeney (2012)). 
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TradetoVWAP = (Pricet/VWAPt - 1) * Buy                         (2)  
Buy takes the value of 1 if the trade is a buy and -1 if the trade is a sell. Thus, positive 
values for these measures represent a cost to the fund; negative measures represent cost 
recovery. Pricet is the value-weighted average trade price of all trades executed in a package. 
OpeningPricet is the first traded price of the stock on the day the first trade in the package was 
executed. VWAPt is the volume-weighted average price of all trades on a given day. This means 
that a trade on a given day in a package is benchmarked against the same day's VWAP, and then 
a value-weighted TradetoVWAP measure is calculated for trade packages over multiple days. 
Hence TradetoVWAP may be seen as to measure transaction cost performance at the intraday 
level while PriceImpact is at the interday level. The two measures therefore measure different 
aspects of transaction costs. 
We also use two measures of alpha: excess returns for 20 trading days (roughly a month) 
subsequent to trade, and excess returns for the period from 20 trading days after the transaction 
to 254 trading days after the transaction (roughly an 11 month return computed from one month 
after the trade). This gives measures of the more immediate benefit of a trade, as well as a 
longer-term performance measure. Specifically we use:  
ExcessReturnst+20 = ( ClosingPricet+20/ClosingPricet - Markett+20/Markett )*Buy  
(3)  
ExcessReturnst+254 = ( ClosingPricet+254/ClosingPricet+20 - Markett+254/Markett+20 )*Buy
            (4) 
ClosingPricet is the last trade price on the day the final trade in a package is executed. 
ClosingPricet+20 and ClosingPricet+254 are dividend and split adjusted stock closing prices 20 
and 254 days after the end of the trade package. Markett, Markett+20 and Markett+254 are the 
value of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index at the end of, 20 days after the end of, and 254 
days after the end of a trade package, respectively.  
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Note that PriceImpact (TradetoVWAP), ExcessReturnst+20, and ExcessReturnst+254 
measures are intentionally structured so that the time periods for each do not overlap. Hence, we 
are able to track benefits to brokerage paid from the start of the trade package to one year after 
the end of the package.4 
3.4. The Model 
Our focus is on differences in performance (alpha and implicit transaction costs of 
trades) between active and passive funds, and between P1 active and P2 active funds. We want 
to see whether active managers use brokerage services differently than passive managers, and 
whether these differences allow active managers to mitigate adverse price impacts from their 
potentially informed trades.  
We begin by relating implicit transaction costs (defined either as Price Impact or Trade 
to VWAP) and alphas of a trade package at the fund/broker level to basic characteristics of the 
order, prevailing market conditions and the style of the fund manager. Hence we specify the 
following regression model for transactions by fund f in stock i, using broker b, where each 
broker / trade package constitutes an observation:  
Performance = γf + αi + β1*Market*Buy + β2*Cap + β3*Brokerage + β4*Complex + 
 β5*Volatility + β6*Days + β7*Informed + β8 Lagflow*Buy + β8*Dayid + ε                              
             (5) 
Where Performance is each of the alpha or transaction cost measures given in equations 
1 through 4. γf and αi denote fund and stock style fixed effects, respectively. These and other 
explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The basic model outlined in equation (5) is constructed relying on explanatory variables 
from the literature. For example, Chiyachantana et al. (2004) use Cap, Complex, Days, Market 
                                                 
4
 We also use log versions of our measures and find that it did not affect the implications of our results. 
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and Volatility. Brokerage, our variable of interest, is used by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) in 
their price impact regressions. Lagflow is taken from papers examining fund flows and mutual 
fund performance (e.g. Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007)). Relying on these studies, we expect 
Lagflow*Buy to be positive and statistically significant if lagged fund flow is associated with 
greater trading immediacy (and therefore higher transaction costs) by funds. We follow 
Chiyachantana and Jain (2009) and use the ex post measure, Informed, to denote trades that may 
contain more information, thereby generating greater price impact and excess return.5  
Our model also includes a time trend, fund ability, and stock style differences in 
transactions (and alpha). Dayid is a trend variable to control for falling brokerage and implicit 
transaction costs.6 The use of fund fixed effects is motivated by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) 
who use univariate analysis to demonstrate price impact differences between growth and value 
funds. In addition, Keim and Madhavan (1997) note that institutions with similar investment 
styles may have different approaches in filling orders and consequently face different implicit 
transactions costs. Motivated by Anand et al. (2012), we control for the systematic difference in 
the type of stocks that institutions trade by using fixed effects based on the style bins used in the 
characteristic-based benchmark method of Pinnuck (2003) (this consists of 60 bins (five size, 
four book-to-market, and three momentum bins)). 
4. Results 
Our analysis of broker trade packages proceeds as follows. In section 4.1 we report 
descriptive statistics and provide an overview of the funds and their broker package trades. We 
then examine changes to the brokerage industry during our sample period. In section 4.2 we give 
                                                 
5
 Note that for the ExcessReturnst+254 regressions we do not include the Informed variable as it is essentially a 
dummy variable version of ExcessReturnst+254. 
6
 As an alternative to linear time trend, we use a proxy for algorithmic trading as developed by Hendershott, Jones 
and Menkveld (2011). That is, we compute the lagged monthly average daily negative value of dollar turnover (in 
hundreds of dollars) divided by the number of order messages (amend, entry and cancellations) of all top 200 stocks 




yearly summaries of brokerage rates, broker revenue, and broker competition. In section 4.3 we 
use estimate based on expression (5) to test H1. This allows us to explore the link between 
brokerage rates and our performance measures (implicit transaction costs and alpha) across our 
funds (active or passive) and sample periods (P1 and P2). In section 4.4 we test H2 and H3 by 
considering differences in Brokerage coefficient estimates. We link these differences to package 
characteristics based on fund type (P1 active relative to P1 passive funds) and period (P1 active 
relative to P2 active funds). We test the robustness of our results by considering whether 
brokerage relations outlined in sections 4.3 and 4.4 hold cross-sectionally with Fama-MacBeth 
regression analysis (in section 4.5). Finally, we test whether the residuals of our baseline 
regression have any subsequent explanatory power (section 4.6). This gives us information on 
the extent to which the model of equation (5) accounts account for sources of variation in our 
performance measures.   
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample of funds. Our transaction data 
consists of 26 funds (18 active and 8 passive) from our first (P1) sample and 33 active funds 
from our second (P2) sample with a total of 118,776 broker trade packages covering $A102.86 
billion dollars of trades.7 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
There are notable differences between the P1 active and P1 passive samples. Active 
funds trade on average larger trade packages (AUD537,640 for P1 active versus AUD192,370 
for P1 passive funds), are smaller (mean monthly fund size of AUD184.86 million versus 
AUD477.39 million), pay higher brokerage (mean value weighted brokerage of 0.275 percent 
versus 0.235 percent), use more brokers (mean monthly brokers per fund of 9.14 versus 7.00) 
                                                 
7
 Trades with no broker ID or that were outside of the reported daily low and high prices were removed. These 
deletions represent AUD5.2 billion in trades, or about 4.8% of total trade value. 
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and trade much more (mean annual turnover ratio of 64.68 percent versus 8.88 percent). P1 
active funds also have higher trade value weighted transaction costs in terms of PriceImpact 
(0.442 percent versus -0.104 percent) and TradetoVWAP (0.154 percent versus 0.053 percent); 
similar short-term alpha (ExcessReturnst+20 of -0.025 percent versus -0.002 percent) and higher 
long-term alpha (ExcessReturnst+254 of 2.093 percent versus 0.950 percent). 
We compare funds between the two periods in terms of size, trading costs, and 
performance. P2 active funds are larger than the P1 active funds; roughly four times as big and 
execute trade packages of over twice the value. P2 active funds incur lower brokerage and 
implicit transaction costs relative to both P1 active and passive funds. In particular, P2 active 
funds earn negative TradetoVWAP costs whereas P1 active and passive funds have positive 
TradetoVWAP costs. Lower P2 transaction costs may be due to less aggressive trading, an 
increase in liquidity, or broker effectiveness. P2 active funds have higher value-weighted 
ExcessReturnst+20 than active and passive P1 funds. However equal weighted ExcessReturnst+20 
and ExcessReturnst+254 values are lower for P2 active funds than P1 active funds. Our regression 
analysis investigates in more detail the relation between brokerage paid and both alpha and 
implicit transaction costs. Finally, the standard deviation of Brokerage (equally weighted) is 
roughly half of average Brokerage; this suggests that there is significant scope for Brokerage to 
explain our Performance variables.  
4.2. Broker Revenue and Competition 
In this section we investigate whether brokers had declining revenue with lower 
institutional brokerage rates. We are also interested in whether there are any changes to the 
broker concentration, i.e. whether changing broker revenue appears to be linked to a changing 
competitive environment.  
For each year we calculate the value-weighted brokerage rate of active funds and the 
total ASX on-market turnover. From these values we compute geometric (log) growth rates of 
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year-on-year brokerage rates, turnover, and implied broker revenue.8 In addition, we calculate 
two industry concentration measures to proxy for broker competitiveness. The first 
concentration measure uses ASX dollar value of trades by broker to calculate a broker 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).9 Our second competitiveness measure uses PAD active 
fund trades to compute a broker HHI value.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Over our sample period active fund brokerage rates (as a percent of trade value) has 
roughly halved from 32.7 basis points in 1995 to 15.5 basis points in 2010. On-market turnover 
has increased dramatically from AUD67.01 billion to AUD981.85 billion (although it peaked 
during 2007 (AUD1,370.20 billion) and 2008 (AUD1,212.17 billion)). Cumulative broker 
revenue log growth (i.e. brokerage log growth plus turnover log growth) over the period is 
193.96 percent.  
Despite this dramatic increase in revenue we find that the HHI of ASX broker trades is 
only slightly higher during our P1 sample. That is, from 1995 to 2001 the yearly average HHI is 
4.83 while in the P2 period it is 5.27. The higher HHI indicates an increase in concentration of 
trading volume via certain brokers. For the HHI of PAD trades we find a similar increase in 
concentration between the P1 and P2 sample periods. Our results suggest that the Australian 
brokerage industry has flourished despite falling brokerage rates, and without an increase in 
industry concentration. 
4.3. Regression Results  
In this section we examine whether brokerage paid (as a percent of trade value) is related 
to either post trade alpha or implicit transaction costs.  We find evidence consistent with H1 for 
                                                 
8
 We define revenue log growth as the log change in brokerage plus the log growth in turnover. Using the median 
brokerage rate of broker trade packages does not change the implication of our results. 
9
 The HHI is defined as the sum of the market shares of each broker’s ASX turnover squared, multiplied by 100. An 
industry with only one firm would have an HHI value of 100. An industry with many small firms would have an 
HHI value close to zero.  
14 
 
index funds and P2 active funds; brokerage is negatively related to implicit transaction costs. 
Also consistent with H1, P1 and P2 active fund brokerage is positively related to alpha (albeit 
short-term alpha benefits to P2 active funds and long-term alpha benefits to P1 active funds).  
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for regressions with the four possible dependent 
variable specifications: PriceImpact (Panel A); TradetoVWAP (Panel B); Excess Returns
 t+20 
(Panel C); and ExcessReturns
 t+254 (Panel D). Values are given for each sample (P1 passive 
funds, P1 active funds, and P2 active funds).  Performance measures are measured as 
percentages; positive coefficients denote increases in alpha or trading costs, whereas negative 
coefficients represent alpha losses or transaction cost recovery.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The control variables across all funds are mostly of the expected sign and are statistically 
significant across the four panels. For example for PriceImpact in Table 3 Panel A, broker trade 
packages are positively related to the market return (Market*Buy) indicating that buy (sell) trade 
packages in a bull (bear) market have higher price impact. Also trades in low liquidity stocks 
(Complex) and by flow pressured funds (Lagflow*Buy) are associated with higher PriceImpact 
and Trade to VWAP. Volatility is negative and significantly related to VWAP across fund 
samples, which suggests that funds are able to improve upon daily VWAP when stocks are more 
volatile.   
We also find that the longer a fund takes to complete a trade package the greater is 
PriceImpact but the lower is TradetoVWAP. Package duration (Days) is positive and statistically 
significant across fund samples for PriceImpact. This findings is similar to Chiyachantana et al. 
(2004) who suggest longer duration trades tend to be worked orders that are more difficult to 
trade. For TradetoVWAP, longer package duration is associated with statistically significant 
lower costs for P1 and P2 active funds, consistent with trading patience. The discrepancy 
between these two measures may be because PriceImpact is measured over several days for a 
trade package (and so allows for the price to drift from day to day), while TradetoVWAP uses 
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the daily VWAP as the benchmark for each day traded in a broker trade package. As such it 
appears that P1 and P2 active funds beat daily VWAP more easily with trade packages of longer 
duration, however at the cost of higher PriceImpact when benchmarked by the opening price at 
the start of the trade package. 
We find evidence that transaction costs are sensitive to brokerage, which is consistent 
with H1 that brokerage is an important factor in assessing implicit transaction costs.10 For 
PriceImpact, the coefficient of Brokerage is negative and statistically significant for our P1 
passive and P2 active funds. For TradetoVWAP it is negative and statistically significant for P1 
passive and P2 active funds, although positive and statistically significant for P1 active funds. 
For example, for P2 active funds, the coefficients for Brokerage across transaction cost 
measures suggests that a basis point increase in brokerage results in a 0.545 basis points fall in 
PriceImpact, 0.444 basis point fall in TradetoVWAP. Our findings therefore provide support for 
H1 that brokers create value by reducing trading costs.  
Our analysis of short-term alpha (ExcessReturns
 t+20) shows P2 active funds have a 
positive and statistically significant Brokerage coefficient of 1.207, suggesting short-term alpha 
is improved for these funds when paying higher brokerage. For our long-term alpha measure, 
Excess Returnst+254, we find that Brokerage is statistically significant only for P1 active funds 
with a large and statistically significant coefficient of 4.793. This may partly explain why P1 
active funds exhibit a positive and statistically significant TradetoVWAP Brokerage coefficient 
of 0.173 and a statistically insignificant coefficient for PriceImpact.  That is, P1 active funds 
may be gaining value from brokerage services through alpha at the expense of execution quality. 
Meanwhile, it appears that P1 passive and P2 active funds derive most benefit from brokerage 
through transaction cost recovery. For P2 active funds, the significant PriceImpact and short-
term alpha Brokerage coefficients suggest a combined benefit through alpha and implicit 
                                                 
10
 Removing trade packages with brokerage rates of one basis point or less did not quantitatively change our results. 
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transaction cost recovery of 1.752 basis points per basis point of brokerage spent. For P1 passive 
funds the significant PriceImpact coefficient of 0.567 suggests slightly more than half of 
brokerage is recovered from implicit transaction costs, while the alpha Brokerage coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. 
Our finding that active funds benefit from long-term alpha (i.e. P1 active funds for 
Excess Returnst+254) or transaction cost recovery (i.e. P2 active for PriceImpact and Excess 
Returns
 t+20 combined) exceed the amount of brokerage paid is of particular note. It may appear 
that paying higher brokerage provides better alpha and/or transaction cost outcomes. However, 
brokerage is only one observable cost component of funds management and as such brokerage 
recovery may be subsidizing other unobservable fund costs, such as fund manager remuneration. 
In addition, the ability of institutional investors to extract value from brokerage is not new. For 
example, Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2011) find that for every $1 excess commission that 
institutional investors pay to lead underwriters results in $2.21 in profits from allocated initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Our results are consistent with active fund managers being able to 
extract different sources of value from brokerage.   
4.4.   Brokerage Effects across Samples 
To test H2 and H3 we consider whether the relation between brokerage and the 
performance measures (alpha or implicit transaction costs) differs between P1 active funds, P1 
passive funds, and P2 active funds. We find evidence consistent with H2 that index funds 
benefit more from brokerage with lower implicit transaction costs than active funds. Also 
consistent with H3, P2 active funds benefit more from brokerage than P1 active funds with 
lower implicit transaction costs. 
To assess the statistical significance of the differences noted above we re-compute the 
regression in equation (5) pooling P1 active and P1 passive fund broker packages while adding a 
P1 fund interaction variable with Brokerage. The interacted Brokerage coefficient is a measure 
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of differences in the sensitivity of brokerage between P1 active and P1 passive funds. We also 
pool P1 active and P2 active fund trade packages and use a P2 fund interaction variable with 
Brokerage to compare brokerage sensitivity between P1 active and P2 active funds. We also 
include similar interactions with the explanatory variables Complex, Volatility and Days to test 
whether these fund groups have different abilities in managing implicit transaction costs or 
alpha generation for various package characteristics (e.g. does Volatility affect TradetoVWAP 
differently for P1 active and P1 passive funds). 
We report the significance of these interacted explanatory variables in Table 3 (we do 
not report updated parameter estimates). We denote statistical significance of the interacted 
coefficients by adding a, b, or c to the reported P1 passive or P2 active regression specifications. 
These denote statistically significant differences from the P1 active coefficients at the one, five 
and ten percent levels, respectively.  
Between P1 passive and P1 active funds, we find there is a statistically significant 
interacted Brokerage coefficient at the ten percent level for both PriceImpact (Table 3 Panel A) 
and TradetoVWAP (Table 3 Panel B). These results provide weak evidence for H2 that passive 
funds are better able to influence implicit transaction costs through brokerage than are active 
funds.  Between P1 active and P2 active funds, the interacted Brokerage coefficients for both 
PriceImpact (Table 3 Panel A) and TradetoVWAP (Table 3 Panel B) is statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  
We find no statistically significant interacted Brokerage coefficients for either of the 
excess return performance measures. For trade characteristics, we find that P1 active funds trade 
more complex packages at lower transaction costs and achieve higher long-term alpha than P1 
passive funds and P2 active funds. This is evident by the significantly different interacted 
Complex coefficients for P1 active relative to P1 passive funds. That is, coefficients are 
significantly smaller for implicit transaction cost regressions and larger for ExcessReturnst+254 
regressions. Our findings are consistent with H3, where we expected lower brokerage rates in 
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the P2 sample to improve the relation between Brokerage and our implicit transaction cost 
measures. Combined with the individual regression results, it appears that P2 active funds 
receive relatively better transaction cost services for brokerage spent than P1 active funds.  
4.5. Quarterly Fama-MacBeth Analysis 
Our base results show that the P1 passive funds and P2 active funds value broker 
transaction services differently and that there is some evidence P1 active funds value broker 
advisory services, as measured by trade package alpha. However this may be a statistical artifact 
of our time period rather than a cross-sectional relation. For example, P1 funds may be paying 
higher brokerage for more effective ‘high touch' transaction services. In P2 brokerage rates are 
lower and there may be an erosion of brokerage transaction services, which may have poorer 
implicit transaction cost outcomes. While the effect of falling brokerage and transaction costs is 
somewhat captured through the use of the linear time trend variable Dayid, we employ Fama-
MacBeth quarterly cross-sectional regressions (i.e. based on the approach in Fama and MacBeth 
(1973)) to test whether the Brokerage coefficient is stable over time. This serves as a robustness 
check to our basic regression results. A stable Brokerage coefficient that is negative for 
transaction costs specifications and positive for alpha specifications would provide stronger 
evidence that high values for Brokerage is not a simple consequence of falling brokerage rates.  
Every quarter, we estimate our transaction cost models for the P1 and P2 active fund 
samples to obtain quarterly estimates of the Brokerage coefficient.11 We then calculate the 
average quarterly time series Brokerage coefficient. Newey-West standard errors with three lags 
are used to estimate t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation. To calculate coefficient differences 
between the P1 and P2 active fund sample, we regress all quarterly Brokerage coefficients on a 
P1 active fund dummy variable and report its coefficient and t-statistic. 
                                                 
11
 There is not enough quarterly variation in brokerage data to provide reliable Brokerage coefficient estimates for 
passive funds.  
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Fama-MacBeth regression results are reported in Table 4. These are consistent with our 
main results that P1 active funds benefit from long-term alpha for brokerage paid, while P2 
active funds benefit from short-term alpha and lower implicit transaction costs. P2 active funds 
benefit more from lower implicit transaction costs for brokerage paid than P1 active funds.  
Table 4 lists average quarterly Brokerage coefficients. Panel A reports average 
Brokerage effects for our two implicit transaction costs measures. Panel B lists average 
Brokerage effects for our two alpha specifications. These results are generally consistent with 
the pooled regression significance results from Table 3.  
For PriceImpact specifications we find P1 active funds have an average Brokerage 
coefficient of -0.005, which is statistically insignificant. This suggests that no PriceImpact 
benefit is derived from brokerage paid in the P1 sample. P2 active funds have an average 
Brokerage coefficient of -0.421 for the PriceImpact measure, which is statistically significant at 
the five percent level.12 However we do not find a statistically significant difference between the 
P1 and P2 active fund coefficients for the PriceImpact measure.  
For our alternative transaction cost measure, TradetoVWAP the coefficient estimates are 
similar to the results reported in Table 3. The difference in coefficients for P1 and P2 active 
funds is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Results using the ExcessReturnst+20 performance measure are reported in Table 4  Panel 
B. We find P2 active funds have a positive and weakly statistically significant average 
Brokerage coefficient of 1.063 which is similar in magnitude, although lacking in statistical 
significance, to the value of 1.207 reported in Table 3 Panel B.  
Finally for ExcessReturnst+254 we find P1 active funds have an average Brokerage 
coefficient of 6.460 which is statistically significant at the ten percent level. Also, the difference 
                                                 
12
 This estimate is slightly lower than the -0.545 reported for the pooled regression in Table 3 Panel A. 
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between the coefficients of P1 and P2 active funds ('P1 Active - P2 Active') is statistically 
significant at the five percent level.  
The Fama-MacBeth excess return results provide further evidence that P1 active funds 
are valuing brokerage through long-term alpha rather than through transaction cost recovery. P2 
active funds obtain value from transaction cost recovery and short-term alpha.  
Overall the Fama-MacBeth results reinforce our pooled regression estimate of statistical 
significance while confirming that estimates reported in Table 3 do not appear to be a 
consequence of inter-temporal variation in brokerage costs. 
4.6. Quarterly Fund and Broker Transaction Cost Contributions 
The findings from our regression and Fama-MacBeth tests show that price impact and 
alpha are related to brokerage. However we do not directly test whether individual broker ability 
may be responsible for improving price impact or trade alpha. If individual brokers or fund 
managers are able to have lower price impact or improve the alpha of trades (controlling for 
trade characteristics) then simply paying higher brokerage may not be a valuable way of 
improving price impact or alpha. That is, the variation in outcome might be broker or fund 
specific. In this section we investigate how brokers and fund managers contribute to transaction 
costs beyond what is captured through the Brokerage regression variable, as well as through our 
control variables. This also serves as a diagnostic to our basic regression – do our regression 
residuals suggest additional, relevant broker or fund related features associated with our 
performance measures. 
We calculate transaction cost contributions of both brokers and active fund trades across 
the two sample periods using a method similar to Anand et al. (2012).13 We calculate the 
                                                 
13
 While our method is similar we lack the cross-sectional breadth of fund and broker pairs required to employ 
Anand et al. (2012)’s exact method. As in our Fama-MacBeth results, we do not analyse P1 Passive funds due to a 
the limited number of quarters for which we have passive fund data. 
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residual performance measure for each trade package (price impact or alpha) after controlling 
for trade characteristics. The residual price impact reflects the broker or fund manager's ability 
to lower (or increase) price impact beyond what is expected by the characteristics of the trade. 
For example, if the average residual price impact across trades by a broker is negative then the 
broker has shown ability to lower price impact. Broker transaction cost contributions are 
calculated using a two-step procedure. First, we compute residuals from the regression of a 
broker package's PriceImpact or TradetoVWAP cost against our explanatory variables and fund 
fixed effects for every quarter. In the second step, we regress these residuals on broker fixed 
effects and take the estimated coefficients for each broker as their transaction cost contribution 
for each of the trade packages that they execute. The broker transaction cost contribution for a 
given quarter is the broker's trade package value weighted average transaction cost contribution. 
For fund transaction cost contributions, we first use broker (instead of fund) fixed effects 
followed by regressing the residuals on fund fixed effects in the second step. 
Table 5 reports the average quarterly broker and fund transaction cost contributions. We 
find that brokers do not generate economically or statistically significant differences in implicit 
transaction costs, beyond those based on our control variables. P2 active broker contribution for 
TradetoVWAP is statistically significant at the five percent level. However, it is an economically 
insignificant -0.3 basis points per quarter.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
In contrast, fund transaction cost contributions are mostly statistically significant at the 
one percent level for both P1 and P2 active funds. For Price Impact, P2 funds have less than half 
the price impact of P1 active funds (0.109 versus 0.252), with the difference being statistically 
significant at the five percent level.  For Trade to VWAP, P1 active funds contribute 9.8 basis 
points per quarter while P2 active funds save 4.1 basis points per quarter, with the difference 
between the samples being statistically significant at the one percent level.  
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For the alpha results in Table 5 Panel B, we find P1 and P2 active fund contributions for 
Excess Returnst+20 being statistically significant at the ten and five percent level, respectively. 
However the P1 Active - P2 Active difference is not statistically significant. 
Overall, the main contributor to variation in incremental transaction costs is the funds 
themselves with the P2 sample experiencing lower transaction costs. Specific brokers do not 
provide additional contributions to alpha and implicit transaction costs. This suggests that the 
brokerage coefficient in our transaction cost and alpha regressions captures the value of 
brokerage. It also suggests that, while brokers appear to provide valuable transaction and 
investment services, there is no strong evidence of broker-specific differences in this value. 
5. Conclusion 
We examine whether brokers provide valuable transaction services that are both 
scrutinized and valued by their clients. Using the trades of active and passive fund managers we 
do not find that active investors in our early sample period (1995-2001) value the implicit 
transaction services of brokers. Across two implicit transaction cost measures we find either no 
statistically significant relation to brokerage costs, and or significantly higher implicit 
transactions costs with higher brokerage rates. We find weak evidence that active fund 
brokerage is positively related to abnormal returns over a one year period, suggesting that higher 
brokerage fees may be related to valuable ancillary brokerage services. Passive funds in the 
same period have weakly significant, negative relation between brokerage rates and implicit 
transaction costs, consistent with better trade execution with higher brokerage.  
In the lower brokerage rate environment from 2002 to 2010, the implicit transaction cost 
measures for our sample of active funds exhibit a highly statistically significant and negative 
relation to brokerage. The estimated coefficients indicate that at 54.5 percent of brokerage 
payments are recouped through lower implicit transaction costs. In addition, short-term alpha 
improvements are estimated to be 120.7 percent of brokerage paid. The finding is robust to a 
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quarterly Fama-MacBeth regression framework, which accounts for differences in trading 
ability over time. In summary, we find that brokers have become even more relevant in 
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Total dollar brokerage cost divided by the dollar trade value of a broker package times 
100. 
 




Natural logarithm of the volume of a broker package divided by the average daily 
trading volume over the prior five days. 
 




Number of days between the first and last trade in a broker package. 
 




Dummy with a value of 1 if the t+21 to t+254 excess market return after the last day of 








Return from the opening level on the first day of the broker package to the closing 
level on the last day of the broker package of the All Ordinaries index. Reversed for 
sells. 
 
Stock Style Fixed Effects 
 
Dummy variable for the size, book-to-market and momentum portfolio bin that a stock 













The table reports various descriptive statistics of fund trade packages from the Portfolio Analytics Database. 'P1 
Passive' and 'P1 Active' refer to funds obtained from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 
while 'P2 Active' funds are from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010. Passive funds 
comprise index and enhanced index funds while active funds are those that select stocks.  A broker trade package is 
defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by 
the same broker for a given fund. Mean monthly fund size is the time series average mean month-end fund size. 
Mean monthly turnover ratio is the time series average monthly turnover ratio. The annual turnover ratio is the sum 
of buy and sell trade values divided by two in a month as a percentage of the total month-end fund size multiplied 
by twelve. Mean monthly brokers per fund is the time series average monthly mean number of brokers used per 
month per fund. 'Equal Weight' denotes equally weighted broker trade package statistics. 'Value Weight' denotes 
trade value weighted broker trade package statistics. 
 
 
 Fund Statistics P1 Passive P1 Active P2 Active 
 Number of Funds 8 18 33 
 Number of Brokers Used 47 82 83 
 Number of Broker Packages 16,109 38,339 64,348 
 Total Packages Value ($bill) 3.10 20.61 79.16 
 Mean Monthly Fund Size ($mill) 477.39 184.86 769.85 
 Mean Annual Turnover Ratio (%) 8.88 64.68 40.80 
 Mean Monthly Brokers per Fund 7.00 9.14 8.80 
 Mean Package Value ($'000) 192.37 537.64 1230.17 
 % Buy Packages by Count 57.58 53.03 49.61 
 % Buy Package by Value 54.51 51.22 48.47 
    













 Mean Brokerage (%) 0.205 0.235 0.287 0.275 0.171 0.185 
 Standard Deviation Brokerage (%) 0.105     - 0.137 - 0.084 - 
 Mean Package Duration (Days) 1.357 1.616 1.676 2.806 1.998 3.046 
 Mean Price Impact (%) 0.088 -0.104 0.231 0.442 0.082 0.141 
 Mean Trade to VWAP (%) 0.135 0.053 0.068 0.154 -0.050 -0.015 
 Mean Excess Returnst+20  (%) -0.253 -0.002 0.250 -0.025 0.130 0.105 








Brokerage Rates and Revenue  
 
This table reports yearly brokerage and trade statistics of active funds in the Portfolio Analytics Database (PAD) 
and aggregate on-market trade statistics on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) from 1995 to 2010. ‘Value 
Weighted Mean Brokerage’ is the trade value weighted brokerage of PAD trades. Brokerage is calculated as the 
dollar commission divided by the trade value times 100. ‘ASX Turnover’ is the dollar value of on-market buy and 
sell trades divided by two. ‘Brokerage Log Growth’ is the natural log of the current year’s brokerage over the prior 
year’s brokerage. ‘Turnover Log Growth’ is the natural log of the current year’s market turnover over the prior 
year’s market turnover. ‘Revenue Log Growth’ is Brokerage Log Growth plus Turnover Log Growth. Broker HHI 
ASX Trades is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of broker trades on the ASX. Broker HHI PAD Trades is 

































1995 0.327 67.01 5.27 10.35 
1996 0.373 91.08 13.07 30.70 43.77 43.77 4.66 5.91 
1997 0.283 114.20 -27.51 22.62 -4.89 38.88 4.78 6.64 
1998 0.275 129.30 -2.88 12.42 9.54 48.42 4.81 7.27 
1999 0.277 170.33 0.58 27.56 28.14 76.56 4.74 7.89 
2000 0.280 218.21 1.17 24.77 25.94 102.50 4.63 7.95 
2001 0.241 269.73 -14.97 21.20 6.23 108.72 4.91 8.19 
2002 0.192 311.03 -22.81 14.24 -8.56 100.16 4.83 9.50 
2003 0.255 334.70 28.39 7.34 35.72 135.89 4.99 6.66 
2004 0.236 429.08 -7.46 24.84 17.38 153.26 4.86 8.74 
2005 0.207 572.75 -13.44 28.88 15.44 168.71 5.10 8.09 
2006 0.190 822.34 -8.42 36.17 27.75 196.45 5.38 8.46 
2007 0.176 1,370.20 -7.51 51.06 43.55 240.01 5.52 7.69 
2008 0.162 1,212.17 -8.36 -12.25 -20.62 219.39 5.79 7.99 
2009 0.164 860.84 1.20 -34.23 -33.03 186.36 5.33 8.30 








Transaction Costs - Base Model 
   
The table reports the regression coefficient estimates of broker trade package transaction costs from fund manager 
trades in the Portfolio Analytics Database as the dependent variable against explanatory variables. A broker trade 
package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap 
apart by the same broker for a given fund.  'P1 Passive' and 'P1 Active' refer to funds obtained from the first survey 
request from January 1995 to December 2001 while 'P2 Active' funds are from the second survey request from 
January 2002 to December 2010. Passive funds consist of index and enhanced index funds while active funds are 
those that select stocks. Clustered standard errors by the start date of a trade package are used. Descriptions of 
explanatory variables are in the Appendix. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. a, b, c denote that brokerage, complex, volatility or days coefficients are statistically different to the P1 









Panel A. PriceImpact         
P1 Passive  P1 Active  P2 Active 
Intercept 1.708 *** 0.902 ***  0.879 *** 
Market*Buy 0.225 *** 0.236 ***  0.247 *** 
Cap -0.075 *** -0.011  0.013 * 
Brokerage -0.567 *b 0.046  -0.545 ***a 
Complex 0.081 ***a 0.043 ***  0.043 *** 
Volatility -0.026 0.023  0.018 * 
Days*100 7.462 *** 3.509 ***  1.906 ***c 
Informed -0.038 0.018  0.006 
Lagflow*Buy*100 11.770 3.335 ***  0.033 
Dayid*1000 0.207 * -0.019  -0.068 *** 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Stock Style Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-square 0.066  0.053  0.070 
Number of Broker Packages 16,109 38,339  64,348 
 
Panel B. TradetoVWAP 
 
P1 Passive  P1 Active  P2 Active 
Intercept 1.494 *** -0.005 -0.395 *** 
Market*Buy 0.005 0.002 0.006 *** 
Cap -0.019 ** 0.010 *** 0.042 *** 
Brokerage -0.315 *b 0.174 *** -0.444 ***a 
Complex 0.022 **b 0.012 *** 0.047 ***a 
Volatility -0.043 *** -0.026 *** -0.005 
Days*100 -1.610 -0.870 *** -1.020 *** 
Informed -0.024 0.005 0.020 *** 
Lagflow*Buy*100 27.630 *** 3.092 *** 0.021 *** 
Dayid*1000 -0.154 ** -0.017 -0.038 *** 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Stock Style Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-square 0.069 0.056 0.036 









 Table 3 continued 
 
Panel C. ExcessReturns
 t+20    
 
P1 Passive  P1 Active  P2 Active 
Intercept -2.170 
 
 -2.730 **  1.572 * 
Market* Buy 0.137 
 










 1.207 ** 
Complex -0.148 **c  -0.036 
 
 -0.079 *** 




























Stock Style Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  




Number of Broker 
Packages 16,109  38,339   64,348  
 












 12.510 *** 
Market* Buy 0.676 
 








 4.793 ***  -2.980 c 
Complex 0.108 a  0.475 ***  -0.034 a 
Volatility -6.310 ***c  -9.930 ***  3.337 ***a 
Days*100 31.140 
 





 1.657 *** 
Dayid*1000 11.620 ***  8.914 ***  -3.130 *** 






Stock Style Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-square 0.085  0.141 
 
 0.034 
Number of Broker 










Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Brokerage Coefficients 
 
 
The table reports average quarterly Fama-MacBeth coefficients of Brokerage from regressing transaction cost 
variables on explanatory variables. The sample contains active funds from the first survey request from January 
1995 to December 2001 ('P1 Active') and active funds from the second survey request from January 2002 to 
December 2010 ('P2 Active') from the Portfolio Analytics Database. A broker trade package is defined by 
consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same 
broker for a given fund. Transaction cost measures are described in section 3.3 and are in percentages. Explanatory 
variables are described in the Appendix. Newey-West standard errors with three lags are used to adjust the t-
statistics. t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Transaction Cost Measures 
 
PriceImpact  TradetoVWAP 
P1 Active -0.005 0.270 *** 
(-0.02) (3.98) 
P2 Active -0.421 ** -0.455 *** 
(-2.24) (-5.54) 
P1 Active – P2 Active 0.417 0.725 *** 
(1.26) (6.81) 
Panel B. Excess Returns Measures 
 
ExcessReturnst+20     ExcessReturnst+254 
P1 Active -0.032  6.460 * 
(-0.05)  (2.05) 
P2 Active 1.063 *  -1.929 
(1.74)  (-0.96) 
P1 Active – P2 Active -1.095  8.389 ** 





Average Quarterly Transaction Cost Contributions by Active Funds and Brokers 
 
 
Broker transaction cost contributions are calculated using a two-step procedure. Firstly every quarter, we obtain the 
residuals from the regression of a broker package's Price Impact or Trade to VWAP cost against our explanatory 
variables and fund fixed effects. In the second step we regress these residuals on broker fixed effects and take the 
estimated coefficients for each broker as their transaction cost contribution for each of the trade packages that they 
execute. The broker transaction cost contribution in a given quarter is the broker trade package value weighted 
average broker transaction cost contribution. For fund transaction cost contributions, we first use broker (instead of 
fund) fixed effects followed by regressing the residuals on fund fixed effects in the second step. The sample 
contains active funds from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 ('P1 active') and active 
funds from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010 ('P2 active') from the Portfolio 
Analytics Database. A broker trade package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with 
trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same broker for a given fund. Transaction cost measures are 
described in section 3.3 and are in percentages. The table reports average quarterly active fund and broker 
transaction cost contributions for P1 active, P2 active and their differences.  Explanatory variables are described in 
the Appendix. Newey-West standard errors with three lags are used to adjust the t-statistics. t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Transaction Cost Measures 
 
PriceImpact  TradetoVWAP 
 
Broker Fund  Broker Fund 
P1 Active 0.001 0.252 *** -0.004 0.098 *** 
(0.13) (3.96) (-1.05) (3.10) 
P2 Active 0.003 0.109 *** -0.003 *** -0.041 *** 
(0.36) (6.15) (-3.14) (-6.94) 
P1 Active – P2 Active -0.002 0.143 ** 0.000 0.139 *** 
(-0.14) (2.16) (-0.045) (4.32) 
Panel B. Excess Returns Measures 
 
ExcessReturnst+20     ExcessReturns t+254    
 
Broker Fund  Broker Fund 
P1 Active 0.026 0.170 * 0.119 0.024 
(1.31) (1.76) (0.63) (0.01) 
P2 Active 0.004 0.334 *** -0.015 -0.663 
(0.30) (2.93) (-0.38) (-0.75) 
P1 Active – P2 Active 0.022 -0.163 0.134 0.687 
(0.88) (-1.09) (0.69) (0.33) 
 
